An identity-based online/offline encryption (IBOOE) scheme splits the encryption process into two phases. The first phase performs most of the heavy computations, such as modular exponentiation or pairing over points on elliptic curve. The knowledge of the plaintext or the receiver's identity is not required until the second phase, where the ciphertext is produced by only light computations, such as integer addition/multiplication or hashing. This division of computations makes encryption affordable by devices with limited computation power since the preparation works can be executed "offline" or possibly by some powerful devices. The identity-based (ID-based) nature of the scheme also allows the preparation of ciphertext without certificate verification.
INTRODUCTION
The notion of online/offline cryptographic algorithm was first introduced by Even, Goldreich and Micali [17, 18] , in the context of digital signature. With this notion, the signing process can be divided into two phases. The first phase is called offline phase which is executed prior to knowing the message to be signed and the second phase is called online phase which is performed after knowing the message. The online phase should be very fast and require only very light computation, such as integer multiplication or hashing. Other heavier computations such as modular exponentiation should be avoided in the online phase. Online/offline cryptographic schemes are thus particularly useful for low-power devices such as smartcards or wireless sensors. It may take a very long time, if not impossible, for these devices to execute heavy cryptographic computation. With this notion, these heavy computations can be done in the offline phase which can be carried out by other powerful devices instead.
Related Work
Several online/offline signature schemes [30, 16, 22, 9, 7, 21, 23] were proposed since the work of Even et al. in 1989 . However, the first online/offline encryption scheme was proposed by Guo, Mu and Chen [20] nearly after two decades. One possible reason for this gap lies in how the public key is associated with the cryptographic object. A signature is bound to the signer's public key, which is obviously known to the signer; while there are many possibilities for the recipient's public key in encryption. It seems challenging to bundle the ciphertext with a public key by only "cheap" operations. Guo et al. did not directly tackle this challenge since their scheme were proposed in the context of identitybased encryption. The difference is that the ciphertext is addressed to an identity but not a public key. The offline phase of their schemes can be carried out without knowing the identity of the recipient.
Many identity-based encryption schemes involve pairing operation which is relatively expensive when compared with other operations such as modular exponentiation. One possible approach to speed up these schemes is to outsource the computation of pairing (e.g., [31, 13] ) to a more powerful device when the pairing operations induce a significant overhead. While this is a possible approach, there exist schemes which the pairing operation in the encryption process can be pre-computed, such as the one proposed by Sakai and Kasahara [26] . For this class of schemes, online/offline technique maybe more promising.
Motivations
We believe that identity-based (ID-based) online/offline encryption is worthy to be studied, from both the practical perspective and the cryptographic design perspective.
Application.
First, ID-based system is particularly suitable for powerconstrained devices. In an ID-based cryptosystem, encryption is done with respect to an arbitrary string corresponding to an identity (e.g., an email address, a device identifier). Only the entity who is "certified" by a trusted key generation center (KGC) will receive a private key for an identity string. This property gives the original motivation of IDbased cryptosystem [29] , which is to eliminate the necessity for checking the validity of certificates in traditional public key infrastructure (PKI). One only needs to know the recipient's identity in order to encrypt a message. It avoids the complicated and costly certificate (chain) verification for the authentication purpose, which is equivalent to at least two signature verifications in PKI-based encryption 1 . Consider a wireless sensor network (WSN) scenario, in which the sensors are collecting sensitive data which is necessary to be encrypted before sending back to the base stations. To ensure timely and efficient delivery of sensitive information, online/offline encryption is a handy tool. It would be much better if part of the encryption process could be done prior to knowing the data to be encrypted and the recipient's public key or identity. The offline part (containing all heavy computations) can be done by a powerful device at the setup or manufacturing stage, which fits exactly with the offline stage of the online/offline encryption paradigm since (obviously) no data is collected and the identity of the base station maybe still unknown to the wireless sensor at this stage. Using an ID-based system, when there is a new node added to the network, other nodes do not need to have its certificate verified in order to communicate in a secure way. This can greatly reduce communication overhead and computation cost.
1 It may cost less than two signature verification for certified encryption [2] , but the specific construction provided in [2] does not support offline preprocessing, specifically, all the exponentiations involved require the knowledge of the message to be encrypted and the identity and the public key of the recipient.
Cryptographic Challenge.
The de facto security standard of encryption scheme is indistinguishability against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA), in which the adversary can ask for the decryption of many ciphertexts except the one it is challenged with. When it comes to online/offline encryption, the division of the encryption algorithm into two stages may introduce vulnerability. Indeed, we found out that [10] a scheme recently proposed [24] is actually vulnerable to CCA attack 2 . There exist generic transformations (e.g. [19] ) for building a CCA-secure scheme from a weaker one (e.g., with one-wayness). Due to the assumption of random oracle, these CCA-transformations are actually very efficient, in the sense that not much computational overhead is introduced to the underlying weaker scheme. However, they are not "online/offline"-aware, i.e., the most expensive part of the encryption can only be done with the knowledge of the recipient and the message.
One may also consider using hybrid encryption to get an ID-based online/offline encryption scheme. Specifically, a key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) is firstly used to derive a session key, then a data encapsulation mechanism (DEM) is used to encrypt the message using the session key produced by the KEM. An obvious requirement that it is possible to divide the KEM into offline stage and inexpensive online stage, which is not formally studied in the ID-based setting. Moreover, a generic transformation borrowing a similar concept for getting CCA security [25] require the underlying building block to support plaintext-check, which possibly translates to a strengthening of the underlying assumption. In particular, the security reduction requires that a certain class of computational problem remains hard even given the access of the corresponding decisional oracle. This may render the security proof unfalsifiable, and possibly one may want to deploy the resulting online/offline system with a larger security parameter which leads to a lower operational efficiency. Ideally, it is desirable to enjoy the online/offline feature without affecting the underlying scheme too much.
Finally, we remark that one can transform an ℓ-level hierarchical IBE (HIBE) to an (ℓ − 1)-level CCA-secure HIBE using a strong one-time signature (OTS) [5] . However, our concern here is efficiency, and the involvement of an "extra" level in HIBE certainly degrades it, not to mention that the signing algorithm of the OTS scheme can only be done in the online stage. To conclude, an efficient way to get CCA security which preserves the online/offline property of the underlying scheme is lacking.
Contribution
Our contribution is in two folds. First, we propose two efficient identity-based online/offline encryption (IBOOE) schemes. One is very efficient with CPA security while the another one achieves the de facto CCA security. Both our schemes come with security analysis in the random oracle model.
As far as the authors know, there are only four IBOOE schemes in the literature. The first two were proposed by Guo et al. [20] . Although they satisfy the basic require-ments, they are not very efficient. The first scheme (denoted by GMC BB ) requires at least 7 pairings to decrypt and the second scheme (denoted by GMC G ) produces very large (more than 6400 bits) ciphertext. Liu and Zhou [24] (denoted by LZ) proposed another IBOOE scheme in the random oracle model. Although the authors claimed that the scheme provides CCA security, it is later found that the scheme is actually CPA secure only [10, 28] . Recently Chu et al. [14] (denoted by CLZBD) also proposed another IBOOE scheme in the selective ID model.
When compared to all previous schemes, our schemes outperform in terms of efficiency. The online computation is the critical factor for IBOOE. Both our schemes only require 1 modular computation in the online stage, which are at least 50% faster than other schemes. For ciphertext size, the ciphertext of our CPA scheme is only 640 bits while that of our CCA scheme is just 800 bits, which is 30% smaller than CLZBD, 3 times small than GMC BB or 8 times smaller than GMC G . Moreover, both our schemes require only 1 pairings in decryption, which is the minimum among all (nononline/offline) efficient identity-based encryption schemes.
Another desirable feature of our schemes is that they work with the setup of the non-online/offline version (in contrast to LZ). Both the administrator and the users of a deployed system does not need to re-setup the whole system and issues new keys to all users to use our online/offline algorithms. Our scheme is based on the identity-based encryption scheme proposed by Sakai and Kasahara [26] , which requires no pairing operation in encryption as we previously mentioned. Moreover, their scheme is one of the few existing schemes which achieves anonymous-ciphertext indistinguishability against KGC attack [11, 12] .
Second, we propose a new notion called Identity-Based Online/Offline KEM (IBOOKEM) which parallelizes the concept of IBOOE in a way that it splits the process of key encapsulation into offline and online stage. Similar to IBOOE, the receiver identity is not required in the offline stage. We provide an efficient instantiation of IBOOKEM and present a generic transformation from any IBOOKEM with one-wayness to CCA-secure IBOOE. Our CCA-secure IBOOE scheme is the result of this efficient transformation. The security of the transformation is argued in the random oracle model.
Organization
Some definitions will be given in Section 2. We present our CPA scheme in Section 3. Next we introduce the new notion of IBOOKEM and give an instantiation and a generic transformation to CCA-secure IBOOE in Section 4. It is followed by the detailed comparison between our schemes and other schemes in Section 5. Finally we conclude the paper in Section 6.
DEFINITIONS

Pairings and Diffie-Hellman Inversion
Let G be an addictive cyclic group and GT be a multiplicative cyclic group, both of prime order q. Let P be a generator of G. We defineê : G × G → GT to be a bilinear pairing if it has the following properties:
We say that the (t, ϵ, ℓ)-BDHI assumption holds in (G, GT ) if no t-time algorithm has advantage at least ϵ in solving the ℓ-BDHI problem in (G, GT ).
Definition of Online/Offline Encryption
An ID-based online/offline encryption (IBOOE) scheme consists of the following five probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithms:
• (param, msk) ← Set(1 k ) takes a security parameter k ∈ N and generates param, the global public parameters and msk, the master secret key of the KGC.
• D ID ← Ext(1 k , param, msk, ID) takes a security parameter k, the global parameters param, a master secret key msk and an identity ID to generate a secret key D ID corresponding to this identity.
•C ← Enc
Off (1 k , param) takes a security parameter k and the global parameters param to generate an offline ciphertextC.
• C ← Enc On (1 k , param, m,C, ID) takes a security parameter k, the global parameters param, a message m, an offline ciphertextC, an identity ID to generate a ciphertext C.
takes a security parameter k, the global parameters param, a ciphertext C, a secret key of the receiver D ID to generate a message m or ⊥ which indicates the failure of decryption.
For simplicity, we omit the notation of 1 k and param from the input arguments of the above algorithms in the rest of this paper.
Definition 2. Chosen Plaintext Security (CPA).
An ID-based online/offline encryption scheme is semantically secure against chosen plaintext insider attack (IND-IOE-CPA) if no PPT adversary has a non-negligible advantage in the following game:
1. The challenger C runs Set and gives the resulting param to adversary A. It keeps msk secret.
2. In the first stage, A makes a number of queries to the extraction oracle OExt(·) simulated by C. A submits an identity ID and gets the result of Ext(msk, ID). These queries can be asked adaptively. That is, each query may depend on the answers of previous ones.
3.
A produces two messages m0, m1 and an identity ID * . C chooses a random bit b ∈ {0, 1} and computes a ciphertext
4.
A makes a number of new queries as in the first stage with the restriction that it cannot query the extraction oracle with ID * .
At the end of the game, A outputs a bit b ′ and wins if
A's advantage is defined as
Next we give the definition of a higher security standard: chosen ciphertext security. The main difference is the additional decryption oracle query. The complete definition is given as follow:
Definition 3. Chosen Ciphertext Security (CCA).
An ID-based online/offline encryption scheme is semantically secure against chosen ciphertext insider attack (IND-IOE-CCA) if no PPT adversary has a non-negligible advantage in the following game:
2. In the first stage, A makes a number of queries to the following oracles simulated by C:
A submits an identity ID to the extraction oracle for the result of Ext(msk, ID).
A submits a ciphertext C and a receiver identity ID to the oracle for the result of Dec(C, D ID ). The result is made of a message if the decryption is successful. Otherwise, a symbol ⊥ is returned for rejection.
These queries can be asked adaptively. That is, each query may depend on the answers of previous ones.
3.
A produces two messages m0, m1 and an identity ID * . C chooses a random bit b ∈ {0, 1} and computes a ciphertext A's advantage is defined as
Definition of Online/Offline KEM
An ID-based online/offline KEM (IBOOKEM) consists of the following five polynomial time algorithms:
• Set: same as IBOOE.
• Ext: same as IBOOE.
is a deterministic algorithm that takes a security parameter k, the global parameters param and a randomness r to generate an offline ciphertextC and a session key K. We require for the same randomness r, the same (K,C) should be generated.
•
, an offline ciphertextC, an identity ID to generate a ciphertext C.
is a deterministic algorithm that takes a security parameter k, the global parameters param, a ciphertext C, a secret key of the receiver D ID to generate a key K or ⊥ which indicates failure of the decapsulation.
Security of IBOOKEM.
The notions of CPA and CCA of IBOOKEM are similar to those for IBOOE, except that there are no challenge messages to encrypt. Instead, in the challenge phase the challenger chooses a random bit b ∈ {0, 1} and the adversary is given a ciphertext C * and a string K * , which will be the session key encapsulated by the ciphertext if b = 1, or a random string if b = 0. The adversary makes adaptive decapsulation queries (for CCA security, except on C * , once revealed), and eventually outputs a guess b ′ for b. We also define another lower level of security: one-wayness. For one-wayness, the adversary A is asked to output an identity ID * after making extraction oracle queries. Then it is given a ciphertext C * and is asked to output a session key K * . The adversary wins if the decapsulation of C * under the secret key of ID * is equal to K * and ID * is not submitted to the extraction oracle. Note that no decapsulation query is allowed in this case. Schemes that are CPA or CCA secure are also one-way.
A's advantage (in breaking one-wayness) is defined as 
NEW CPA-SECURE ID-BASED ONLINE / OFFLINE ENCRYPTION
We first explain the intuition behind the design of our scheme. The ID-based private key of our scheme uses the exponent-inversion key of the IBE proposed by Sakai and Kasahara [26, 8] (SK − IBE scheme). Then we prove the security of our scheme assuming the SK − IBE scheme is secure.
Our Construction
Set: The KGC selects a generator P ∈ G and randomly chooses s ∈R Z * q . It sets P pub = sP . Let n be the length of the message to be encrypted. Also let H1 : {0, 1} * → Z * q and H2 : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} n be some cryptographic hash functions. The public parameters param and master secret key msk are given by param = (G, GT , q, P, P pub , n, H1, H2) msk = s Ext: To generate a secret key for a user with identity ID ∈ {0, 1} * , the KGC computes:
Randomly generates x, α, β ∈R Z * q and computes:
Outputs the offline ciphertextC = (T0, T1, (c ′ , α, β)). Note thatê(P, P ) can be pre-computed by the KGC as part of the param so that no pairing is needed in this phase.
Enc
On : To encrypt a message m ∈ {0, 1} n to ID, at the online stage, computes:
Outputs the ciphertext C = (T0, T1, t ′ 1 , c). Dec: To decrypt using secret key D ID , computes
and outputs m.
Security Analysis
Theorem 1. Our IBOOE scheme is CPA-secure, assuming the SK − IBE is CPA-secure in the random oracle model.
Proof. Assume there is an adversary
A who can break the CPA-security of our scheme, we construct another adversary B to break the CPA-security of SK − IBE scheme.
The setup algorithm and the extraction algorithm are the same as those in SK − IBE scheme. Thus the challenger can forward the parameters from SK − IBE to A. It can also forward any extraction oracle request to the extraction oracle from SK − IBE.
We just need to show how to construct a challenge ciphertext of our scheme, from the challenge ciphertext of SK − IBE. Given a challenge ciphertext of SK − IBE which is in the form of C * = ⟨X, C⟩, where
for a challenge message m * and some x ∈ Z * q , where H4 is a hash function modeled as a random oracle. We generate
1 , c * ) as follows.
Pick a random R ∈ G.
2. Pick a random s ∈ Zq.
Set
It is a perfect simulation, as we can see the following facts:
1. We express R = rP and define α = H1(ID) − r/x. Since R is random, so does α. We can then express T * 0 in the following way.
We define β = s(H1(ID) − α).
Such β always exists since we are working in Zq. Moreover, since α is random, so does β. We have:
We can then express t *
H2(ê(P, P )
x , T * 1 ) = H4(ê(P, P ) x ), which we can implicitly define in the random oracle model.
ONLINE/OFFLINE KEM AND GENER-IC CCA-SECURE TRANSFORMATION
In this section, we propose a generic transformation from any IBOOKEM (with one-wayness) to IBOOE with CCAsecurity. We first give a generic transformation, then we give an instantiation of the IBOOKEM.
Our Transformation
Set: Same as the underlying IBOOKEM, except the system parameter also contains the descriptions of two additional hash functions H and H ′ which map any arbitrary string to some appropriate domains.
Ext: Same as the underlying IBOOKEM.
Enc
Off : To generate an offline ciphertext, generates a randomness r and computes:
Outputs the offline ciphertextC = {CKEM , K, r}.
Outputs the ciphertext C = {C1, C2, C3}.
Dec: To decrypt using secret key D ID , split {C1, C2, C3} ← C and computes:
If ⊥ is the output, outputs ⊥. Otherwise computes
Security Analysis of Our Transformation
Theorem 2. Our IBOOE is CCA-secure in the random oracle model, assuming the underlying IBOOKEM is oneway.
Proof. Setup: Assume there is an adversary A who can break the CCA-security of the IBOOE, we construct another adversary B to break the one-wayness of the underlying IBOOKEM.
The setup algorithm and the extraction algorithm are the same as those in the IBOOKEM scheme. Thus the challenger can forward the parameters from IBOOKEM to A. It also forwards any extraction oracle request to the extraction oracle from IBOOKEM. In addition, the challenger C also simulates two random oracles H and H ′ in the typical way.
Decryption Oracle: Upon received a decryption request for a ciphertext {C1, C2, C3} and an identity ID, the challenger does the following:
1. Retrieves {hi} from the random oracle H list such that
• the Ki from random oracle H is the same as the Ki from H ′ random oracle.
For every {hi} from the last step, extracts (C
If both equalities hold, outputs H ′ (Ki, C1) ⊕ C3. Otherwise outputs ⊥.
} as the challenged ciphertext to A for some randomly picked C * 2 and C * 3 . If A is able to win the game with non-negligible probability, it should have queried H(K * , C ′ , m * ) and H ′ (K * , C ′ ) before outputting the bit b ′ . C randomly chooses a random oracle query and outputs the first component as the output to the game IBOOKEM.
Probability Analysis: If A does not make any query with K * , it does not gain any advantage for the random guess. If it does, C succeeds with probability 1/qH . Let |K| represents the domain space of K. A false ciphertext will be accepted with probability 1/|K|. Thus the overall successful probability of C should be Pr[A]/qH − qD/|K|, where qH and qD represent the number of random oracle query and decryption oracle query allowed respectively.
Our Instantiation of IBOOKEM
Set: The KGC selects a generator P ∈ G and randomly chooses s ∈R Z * q . It sets P pub = sP . Let H1 : {0, 1} * → Z * q be a cryptographic hash function. The public parameters param and master secret key msk are given by
To generate a secret key for a user with identity ID ∈ {0, 1} * , the KGC computes:
For a randomness r ∈ {0, 1}k wherek is some security parameter, generate r ′ , α, β ∈ Z * q , computes the session key as:
and the offline ciphertext as:
Outputs the offline ciphertextC = {T0, T1, α, β} and the session key K. Note that this should be deterministic. That is, for the same input randomness r, the same output K,C should be obtained.
KEM
On : To generate a ciphertext for ID at the online stage, computes:
Outputs the ciphertext C = (T0, T1, t ′ 1 ). DeKEM: To recover the session key using secret key D ID , computes
Security Analysis of Our Instantiation
For completeness, we give a direct proof resembling that of [8] here, instead of reducing the one-wayness of our scheme to that of the underlying SK − IBE [26] .
Theorem 3.
If there is an IOKEM-OW adversary A of the proposed scheme that succeeds with probability ϵ, then there is a simulator B running in polynomial time that solves the (ℓ + 1)-BDHI problem with probability at least ϵ · 1 q 1 where q1 is the number of queries allowed to the random oracle H1 and we assume q1 = ℓ. 
q and sets
It randomly choosesŵ ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ} \ {π}, and computes the public key P pub as
) so that its unknown master secret key msk is implicitly set to x = −α − Iπ ∈ Z * q , while public parameter param are set to (G, P pub ) which are given to the adversary. For all i ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ} \ {π}, we have (Ii, −Hi) = (Ii,
Oracle Simulation: B first initializes a counter ν to 1 and starts A. We assume that H1-queries are distinct, and that the target identity ID * is submitted to H1 at some point. , we can check that
which is a perfectly simulated ciphertext.
Output Calculation: A outputs a session key K * , with probability ϵ it is in the right form, that is,
where f (z) = ∑ ℓ−1 i=0 ciz i is the polynomial for which G = f (α)P . The (ℓ + 1)-BDHI solution can be extracted by computing
Probability Analysis: B only fails in providing a consistent simulation because one of the following independent events happen:
• E1 : A does not choose to be challenged on IDπ.
• E2 : A key extraction query is made on IDπ.
We have Pr[¬E1] = 1/q1 and ¬E1 implies ¬E2. Combining together, the overall successful probability Pr[¬E1] is at least
COMPARISON
We use GMC BB and GMC G to denote the schemes proposed in [20] , LZ and CLZBD to denote the schemes proposed in [24] and [14] respectively. We assume that |G| = 160 bits, |q| = 160 bits, |GT | = 1024 bits and the length of the plaintext n = |q| = 160 bits for the following comparison. We denote by SM the scalar multiplication in G, EXP the exponentiation in GT , M SM the multi-scalar multiplication in G, M EXP the multi-exponentiation in GT (which cost about 1.3 times more than a single scalar multiplication or a single exponentiation respectively), P A the point addition in G or GT , M U L the modular computation in Zq and SE the CCA secure symmetric key encryption.
GMC BB requires an online/offline signature for encryption. For a fair comparison, we take a very efficient instantiation in [4] . The costs involved are as follow -320 bits for offline storage and for signature length, and 1 SM operation for the key generation and for the offline signing, which have been added to the table. Each signature verification requires one pairing operation and their decryption algorithm requires the verification of one signature, which explains the (+1) in the decryption cost listed in the table. Table 1 shows that our scheme achieves the least computation and the smallest size in both offline and online stage. There are a number of significant improvements:
1. Online computation is the main focus of online/offline encryption. Our schemes (both CPA and CCA) only require 1 modular computation in the online stage. Our schemes do not require any point addition (P A operation) or symmetric encryption in the online encryption stage. Modular computation (M U L operation) is much faster than P A operation. Thus our online encryption stage is the fastest among all other schemes.
2. The offline storage is very small. For the CPA version, it is the smallest among all other schemes. It just requires 800 bits. For the CCA version, it is also smaller than GMC BB by 30% and about 3 times smaller than GMC G . This result is important for embedded devices with very limited storage.
3. The ciphertexts of our schemes (both CPA and CCA) are the smallest among all other schemes. For the C-PA scheme, it is about 50% smaller than LZ, while for the CCA scheme, it is also 30% smaller than CLZBD. When compared to GMC BB and GMC G , the improvements are even greater. It is almost 3 times smaller than GMC BB and 8 times smaller than GMC G . This improvement is very significant when the communication bandwidth is very limited, which is typical in the environment where computationally-limited devices are deployed.
4. Both our schemes only require 1 pairing operation in the decryption stage, which is the minimum requirement for any efficient identity-based encryption scheme in the state-of-the-art 4 . It is about 4 times less than CLZBD. Although decryption is usually done in the server side with more computation power, for decryption of a huge number of ciphertexts, this improvement will be significant as pairing is the most time and power consuming algorithm.
We remark that our security proof is given in the random oracle model. While a reductionist proof in the random oracle model may be considered as a heuristic argument since no real-world hash function can be used to instantiate the random oracle, arguably it still achieves an acceptable level of security. On the other hand, in general, a scheme with security analysis assuming the random oracles is more efficient than a scheme with similar features but with a proof in the standard model. There are many applications that put efficiency as the most important factor. In these scenarios, schemes that are efficient but with security analysis only in the random oracle model maybe a better choice.
In addition, we provide an optimized CPA version, for scenarios where CPA security is enough and CCA security maybe an overkill. The size of the ciphertext is just 640 bits and the offline storage is just 800 bits. It provides an excellent environment for those very low power devices to carry out "secure enough" encryption.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We have proposed a new and efficient identity-based online/offline encryption scheme. We provided two versions: a very efficient CPA version and a CCA version that achieves the highest security level. When compared to previous constructions, our scheme (both versions) enjoys a number of significant improvements in efficiency. These improvements allow our scheme to be used in many practical scenarios such as smart card and wireless sensor networks. The security of our schemes are analyzed in the random oracle model.
Our study of the notion of identity-based online/offline key encapsulation mechanism, and the online/offline preserving CCA-transformation may be of independent interests. Research effort can now be made in devising a very efficient KEM that is only one-way secure.
Since our scheme is based on the widely used Sakai and Kasahara IBE [26, 8] or more generally, the exponent-inversion framework [6] , applications are numerous. We leave the details of an online/offline ID-based signcryption scheme based on [1] , and an online/offline attribute-based encryption scheme based on [6] as our future work. Another interesting direction is to devise online/offline scheme for "special" IBE such as IBE for complex hierarchy [32] , which may find application when encryption is done in weak devices such as publish/subscribe system over wireless sensor networks [15] .
